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NOVEMBER
1918 : THE GERMAN REVOLUTION
By Robert Gerwarth
Oxford University Press. 329 pages. £20. ISBN 978-0-19-954647-3
Reviewed by Jim Burns
NOVEMBER 1918 : THE
GERMAN REVOLUTION
By Robert Gerwarth
Oxford University
Press. 329 pages. £20. ISBN 978-0-19-954647-3
Reviewed by Jim
Burns
Was there a
revolution in Germany in 1918? I suppose for many people the word
conjures up pictures of crowds in the streets and, depending on
which revolution comes to mind, people being shot down by police or
troops defending the government of the day, or the people storming
into the parliament buildings and appointing themselves as the new
rulers. There are other scenarios, but overall the general
impression is one of noise and excitement and varying levels of
violence.
It’s true that noise
and excitement and armed troops and crowds were in evidence during
events in Germany in November 1918, but there was surprisingly
little violence. That came later. For the most part the revolution
in Germany, and it was, “as much a cultural and social revolution
affecting gender relations and citizen rights as it was a political
one”, was achieved without the sort of turmoil evident in Russia.
There were elements on the Left in Berlin and elsewhere who would
have preferred to see blood on the pavements and bodies in the
gutters, but they were mostly sidelined by the mass of people who
wanted change, but not of the kind taking place in Moscow and St
Petersburg.
The situation in
Germany in November can best be described as chaotic. Four years of
war had weakened the will of many people to carry on fighting. The
British naval blockade of German ports had reduced imports of food
and other essentials to the point where the civilian population was
experiencing levels of rationing that were leading to malnutrition.
Soldiers at the front were also affected. There had been a surge of
optimism early in 1918 when a major German offensive on the Western
Front had appeared to have been initially successful, but it soon
petered out. And with America sending large numbers of troops to
Europe it was obvious that it was only a matter of time before
Germany would be forced to sue for a peace deal. It wasn’t
necessarily the way that diehards in the armed forces wanted the war
to end. They thought it was better to go down fighting, even if
defeated.
Matters came to a
head in the ports. The German High Seas fleet had not ventured out
in strength since the indecisive battle of Jutland in 1916.
Submarines had been the prime factor in warfare at sea, and it was
the policy of unrestricted attacks on shipping, targeting any sort
of ship, neutral or not, deemed to be sailing to an Allied port,
that had brought America into the war. But if the submariners felt
that they were dedicated to what they were doing, the majority of
sailors in Kiel and other ports didn’t share their sentiments. When
it became known that there were plans to take the fleet out for a
final confrontation with the Royal Navy, the sailors mutinied and
refused to obey orders. Their view was that there was little point
in being killed fighting an unnecessary battle in a war that was
clearly lost. Germany’s allies – Bulgaria, Turkey, the
Austro-Hungarian Empire – had already collapsed, and it was only a
matter of time before Germany had to capitulate.
It’s interesting that
the German Revolution started in the form that it did. Unlike other
revolutions, it didn’t begin in a central location, such as Paris in
1789 or St Petersburg in 1917. It
kicked off in Kiel and quickly spread to other ports, and to towns
and cities across the country. Soldiers in garrisons soon joined
sailors and striking factory workers in setting up Soldiers and
Workers Councils, sometimes under the guidance of politicised
militants who had been inspired by the example of the Russian
Revolution. But spontaneity may have been as much a part of what
happened as any system of politically-motivated action. A desire to
see the war ended, food shortages dealt with, and a fair peace deal
arrived at, were key factors in the commitment to participation in
the events of November, 1918.
In Berlin there were
differences between those who wanted to immediately ask the Allies,
primarily Britain, France, and America, for peace negotiations, and
those who wished to try to sustain a unity that would enable the
German delegation to negotiate from a strong position. Contact had
been made with the American President, Woodrow Wilson, and he had
suggested that any peace agreement should not involve questions of
annexations or indemnities. But when negotiators from both sides met
it was obvious that France and Britain were setting the terms and
financial concessions and territorial adjustments were prime
components of any peace plan.
Using the word
“negotiations” in the context of what happened is misleading. The
Germans were simply given a list of the terms the Allies thought
appropriate and told they weren’t up for discussion. It was a case
of accept them or the war would continue and almost inevitably lead
to an Allied occupation of Germany. Leaving
aside the financial aspects involved, Germany lost large amounts of
its territory and its overseas colonies, and had its armed forces
cut to the point where they could no longer present a threat.
The terms shocked
most Germans, no matter what their political persuasions were, but
the government in Berlin, newly formed after the Kaiser had been
forced to abdicate, finally had to accept them. Faced with a
continuing blockade of German ports, unrest in the street, the
likelihood that a deteriorating domestic situation could lead to a
revolution along the lines of what had happened in Russia, and a
desperate need to establish some semblance of normality, they had
little choice in the matter. But it was clear that what was seen as
the craven behaviour of the liberals would provide a breeding ground
for anger and resentment among right-wing elements in the country.
The army had not been defeated on the battlefield, they claimed. It
had been brought to its knees by left-wingers and liberals at home.
Despite all the
problems that existed, Germany had so far not seen violence of the
kind happening in Russia, where the Revolution and the ensuing Civil
War had torn the country apart. The Kaiser and his family had
departed without any great fuss, and a liberal government, dominated
by the Social Democrats (SPD), was quite firmly in control. When
elections were held early in 1919 the SPD had the most votes, and
the voting pattern generally showed that the majority of Germans
were in favour of a democratically elected, moderate form of
government. There were groups on the Left and the Right which didn’t
agree, but they were relatively small and seemingly insignificant.
Small as they were
they could still be troublesome, especially when their leanings were
leftwards. The Spartacists, led by Karl Liebnecht and Rosa
Luxemburg, launched an uprising in Berlin in an attempt to overthrow
the government. It was probably doomed to fail from the start. The
authorities still had some troops at their disposal, and
additionally called on the Freikorps, an organisation largely
comprised of ex-soldiers who had bitterly opposed the agreed peace
terms. They had no love for the new liberal government, but hated
left-wingers even more. The rising was easily suppressed in a few
days of street fighting. Liebnecht and Luxemburg were both taken
prisoner and murdered by members of the Freikorps.
It was a similar
story in Munich when there was an attempt to set up a Bavarian
Socialist Republic. It had little support outside the city and even
within it failed to organise food supplies and other essential
services in a way that would inspire confidence from the general
population. It created a workers’ militia, supposedly to defend the
Republic, but when faced by the ruthless Freikorps and regular army
troops it soon melted away. It always seems to have been a dream of
left-wingers that arming the working-class would guarantee a
successful revolution. Perhaps the example of Russia persuaded them
that it was the case?
But the Bolsheviks had armed sailors, units of the army, and
Trotsky’s relatively well-trained and disciplined Red Guards to call
on. Simply handing out guns to factory workers, clerks, and others,
was never likely to lead to success while there were enough
motivated troops and police ready to support the authorities. When
there were major strikes in the Ruhr they were suppressed, again
with help from the Freikorps. The strikers, led by left-wing social
democrats and communists, formed a 50,000 strong Red Army, initially
as a self-defence force, and increasingly as a means to press for
radical reforms, such as the nationalisation of major industries.
When the army moved in the fighting was notably intense, with around
1,000 workers and 250 troops killed.
Robert Gerwarth’s
book is primarily about the Revolution, but it’s legitimate to look
at what happened once a degree of stability was achieved. The
government, led by Friedrich Ebert, faced massive problems, not
least of which was the question of paying off the debts owed to
Britain and France. There was soon the rising inflation which
reached levels that ordinary people struggled to cope with. Visitors
to Berlin from America and Britain lived well on exchange rates
which meant that they could use the city almost as a playground and
the people almost as their playthings.
This is the Berlin we
like to see in feature films and documentaries with cabarets, sex
clubs, cafés and bars thriving. What was happening in the
working-class districts of the city is rarely alluded to. Whatever
benefits built up as the economy steadied and expanded didn’t filter
down to the lower-levels of society to noticeable effect. And the
frustration and anger persuaded many workers to often incline
towards the extreme Left or the extreme Right when it came to their
politics. But, as Gerwarth notes, “in 1928, in the last general
election before the Great Depression, a clear majority of voters
supported parties that were not hostile to the Republic”.
It was when
unemployment and hunger started to rise after 1929 that membership
of both the Communist Party and the Nazi Party began to increase.
Those factors, and the slavish role of the German Communist Party
(KPD) in following Stalin’s orders by refusing to cooperate with the
SPD (referred to a “social fascists”), possibly allowed Hitler to
come to power in 1933. It’s a matter of contention whether or not
the communists could have stopped the Nazis in the streets. From a
military point of view Hitler and his supporters were much better
prepared, and could probably count on support from the police and
units of the army.
In some ways what the
Weimar Government achieved in its lifetime, between 1918 and 1933,
can be seen as quite remarkable. Leaving aside the reparations and
the inflation, new laws were passed which established a system of
proportional representation. and which enfranchised women for the
first time. Their votes were
probably a major factor in the 1919 election. There were many more
women than men who were entitled to vote because of the large loss
of life among men who fought in the First World War. There were also
new laws which led to greater degrees of sexual and social freedom
for women.
It perhaps wasn’t all
perfect. There were still many social and legal restrictions to be
overcome, and attitudes outside Berlin, and especially in rural
areas, were often extremely conservative. Again, too many of our
views of Germany in the 1920s have been determined by a narrow
awareness of what went on in Berlin. Little is known about the
countryside and even towns and cities where citizens probably
breathed sighs of relief when communists and their sympathisers were
quickly sent packing. And where radical cabarets and gay and lesbian
nightclubs were not looked on favourably. One of the appeals of the
Nazi Party to many people was that it appeared to support
traditional values regarding the family and middle-class morality.
And to be generally in favour of good order in everyday life. There
were always people waiting in the wings and ready to oppose any form
of social, sexual, and political liberalisation.
November 1918 provides a
first-rate survey of events and personalities surrounding the
revolution in Germany. Robert Gerwarth takes the reader from 1914 to
1918 in brisk fashion, and then describes how and why the revolution
came about. From there he shows, by contrasting the social structure
of a nation going confidently into war with that taking it out of
the war, why a revolution was inevitable. And it was a revolution.
Those who dreamt of a socialist state didn’t think so, but in terms
of offering the great majority of the population a better way of
life it was, for a time, successful. That it ultimately failed, and
why it did so, can be argued about. As can what would have happened
had the Nazis not been able to seize on the opportunities offered by
the onset of the Depression. But due acknowledgement ought to be
made to those politicians and others who, during the Weimar years,
tried to reconstruct and reform a badly damaged society in
particularly difficult circumstances.
Robert Gerwarth has
written a detailed account of a fascinating topic. The writing is
clear and avoids jargon
and theory. The research is thorough, as is made evident by the
notes and the comprehensive bibliography.
His book has academic
credibility but can also be recommended for the general reader.
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