RUSSIAN LIBERALISM

By Paul Robinson

Northern Illinois University Press. 289 pages. £22.99. ISBN 978-1-5017-7217-7

Reviewed By Jim Burns

“Liberalism is an ideology, a political movement, and a set of cultural, political, and economic practices aimed at maximising personal potential by putting into effect a distinct set of values, such as liberty and pluralism, through a distinct set of institutions such as free markets and representative government”.

That’s the definition given by Paul Robinson at the beginning of this detailed and clearly written book about the ups and downs of the liberal idea in Russia from around the early nineteenth century to the more recent invasion of Ukraine. It might help to have it in mind when following the twists and turns of liberalism as it responded to other forces which shaped the development of the Russian state. It might also help if it’s understood that not every liberal necessarily held to every aspect of liberalism. Some could be quite illiberal when faced with certain situations which appeared to hold a threat to their beliefs and, the more cynical might suggest, their privileges.

Applying a specific date to the emergence of liberal ideas isn’t easy, and may not be useful. Robinson says that “The history of Russian liberalism begins in the second half of the eighteenth during the reign of Catherine II (reigned 1762-1796) when Enlightenment ideas of reason and progress made their way into Russia”. But he later refers to a suggestion, with regard to any wider spread of liberal ideas, that a start can only be located “in the early decades of the nineteenth century when legal education and especially courses in natural law awoke many Russians to the notions of civil and political rights”. He then goes on to say that “while liberal ideas were beginning to emerge in this period, historians note that these ideas came together to form a programme for political and social change only from the mid-1850s onward.”

Robinson is careful to observe that historians often disagree about who can be considered a liberal. He cites the example of Boris Chicherin, “who is normally considered one of the central figures in the history of Russian liberalism,” being denied that role by one commentator, whereas Aleksandr Herzen, “generally considered a radical,” is said by the same commentator to be a liberal. It seems to be the case that, without an established tradition of liberal ideas to call on, anyone “with a vaguely defined commitment to personal freedom” could be seen as a liberal in mid-nineteenth century Russia.

“In Western Europe, the rise of liberalism was associated with the development of capitalism and the rise of a large and powerful bourgeoisie class”. These conditions did not apply in Russia, where autocracy was firmly in the saddle, and the economy, still largely based on the rural, did not provide the circumstances for an influential mercantile population. If liberalism existed it was “not bourgeois but intellectual”. Robinson makes the point that liberals rarely exhibited any “clearly defined commercial interests” and tended to “prioritise cultural and political concerns over economic ones……Russian liberalism has been a decidedly elite phenomenon with few connections with the mass of the Russian people. As such it has very much reflected the culture of the elite”. And it has been associated with “the concept of Westernisation”, a dominant aspect of which is the notion that the West represents an ideal whose norms all other civilisations should adopt…..Westernisation as an inevitable process”. Not everyone has welcomed this possibility.

There were liberal reforms in the nineteenth century, the most obvious being the emancipation of the serfs in 1861. But such actions came from above, and were mostly driven by what Robinson describes as an “enlightened bureaucracy”. And Czar Alexander the Second who, aware of the shortcomings  (a lack of industry needed to produce what an efficient army required, and outdated methods of conscription), that had led to Russia’s defeat in the Crimean War, determined to push for changes which would bring Russia into the modern world. It wasn’t easy to overcome the objections to reforms, and there was a “conservative turn in Russian politics” due to an uprising in Poland in 1863, and a rise in “revolutionary terrorism”, two of the main instigators of it being Sergei Nechaev and Mikhail Bakunin. Alexander was still trying to bring in reforms when he was assassinated by members of the People’s Will, an organisation dedicated to the “destruction of the imperial state”. The differences between those liberals pushing for change through peaceful means, and the anarchists and others who favoured violence, was always pronounced in Russian politics. The actions of the advocates of violence often brought about repressive measures by the authorities which affected both groups.

The events of 1905, when protestors in St Petersburg were killed by troops on what became known as “Bloody Sunday” were, perhaps, among the most significant in the history of Russian liberalism. They brought about the formation of the Kadet Party which, thanks to its representation in the Duma, and until its suppression by the Bolsheviks in 1917, spoke for the liberals in Russia. They were part of the Provisional Government which briefly ruled Russia after the overthrow of the Czar in February 1917, and as a party supported the continuation of the war against Germany. During the civil war in Russia the Kadets identified with the White armies which attempted to defeat and displace Lenin and his left-wing government. The Kadets were, in effect, the last organised expression of liberal ideas until the collapse of the USSR in 1991. Individuals may have continued to express liberal ideas in the 1920s and after, but it was never really safe to do so. 

Robinson records that “a million or so Russians fled the country after the revolution”, and describes how, in 1922, the “Soviet regime deported around 200 or so of the country’s leading thinkers, including some of Russia’s most prominent philosophers and economists, such as Nikolai Berdiaev, Semyon Frank, Boris Brutskus and Nikolai Zvorykin. These names may not be familiar to most English readers, but were clearly considered of importance enough for the Bolsheviks to want to remove them because of their possible influence on the dissemination of ideas in Russia. The state was determined to control everything.  A detailed account of those involved can be found in Lesley Chamberlain’s The Philosophy Steamer : Lenin and the Exile of the Intelligentsia, published in 2006.

Obviously, the 1930s and 1940s were bleak years for Russian liberals, assuming any were brave enough to speak out during the years when Stalin was in power. There was a “period of relative freedom of thought and expression” following Khrushchev’s 1956 revelations of Stalin’s crimes, but when Brezhnev replaced him in 1964 hopes of more-liberal policies were dashed. The Soviet repression of the 1968 “Prague Spring” further emphasised that attempts to loosen communist control of any sphere of life would not be tolerated.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 did bring change. Gorbachev instituted numerous reforms, and when Yeltsin took over in 1996 liberalisation continued at an increased pace. But it may not have always been for the best. The economic liberals in office believed in free markets, and what Robinson says was “shock therapy” and “privatisation”, which left many people struggling to survive. The liberals who pushed through these measures “were intellectuals who displayed little interest in talking to and winning the support of the public at large….They exhibited what has been called ‘an almost scornful condescension in the attitudes towards ordinary citizens’ ”.  They were not dissimilar to earlier liberals who often had a deep distrust, and perhaps even dislike, of the mass of ordinary people.  Vissarion Belinsky, a nineteenth century liberal with a leaning towards the use of literary criticism to express his ideas, had remarked, “people are so stupid that you have to lead them to happiness”.

 Although many people in the West are inclined to the view that Putin has little in his favour, he did stabilise Russia following the disastrous years when Yeltsin almost wrecked the economy: “When Putin was first elected, Russia was in disarray. The economy had yet to recover from the travails of the 1990s. Crime was rampant. Life expectancy had fallen significantly”.  Hence his continued popularity among many Russians, if not those with a liberal-intellectual inclination. And it’s true that he’s hardly noted for presiding over a state which respects human rights such as freedom of expression or assembly. It may also be true that he has now, in some ways, de-stabilised the Russian economy with his invasion of Ukraine.

Robinson has some interesting comments on the views of contemporary Russian liberals, a few of which are amusing, others less so. When the “government banned the import of certain luxury Western goods, including European cheeses, liberals were indignant. Sergei Medvedev complained, ‘Among the losses of recent years – the free press, fair elections, an independent court – what has been especially hard has been the disappearance of good cheese’ ”. Did Medvedev have his tongue firmly in his cheek when he wrote this? I hope so, but if he didn’t perhaps I ought not to criticise him too much, having seen what trivialities seem to concern many British liberals.  

On the other hand, Konstantin Eggert “resigned from the British think tank Chatham House after it gave an award to a BLM leader. In his letter of resignation, he noted ‘I was born in the Soviet Union. My family members suffered imprisonment and death at the hands of a regime that espoused many of the traits that BLM displays directly or by implication: contempt for the rights of those they do not agree with, for freedom of speech and inquiry……people with my historical experience know the totalitarian ethic when they see it. Today I do’ “. If only a few local liberals would say something when speakers are shouted down by BLM and other minority groups, instead of appeasing them and making excuses for their behaviour.

Russian Liberalism is a book to make one think, and not only about the historical context of liberalism in Russia. Why is it still not a broad movement with any kind of power to persuade a sizeable proportion of the population to adopt what are called liberal views: “the main problem of post-Soviet ‘liberalism’ is that it doesn’t speak in a language comprehensible to fellow citizens”. It’s the “ideology of a minority …….at best indifferent and at worst hostile to the majority”. Those are the words of Olga Malinova, as quoted by Robinson. Little wonder that, as he notes, “Over the past twenty years support for liberal political parties has declined”. Liberals are seen as unpatriotic and pro-Western in their attitudes. They want Russia to become like the West, and don’t bother to ascertain whether or not everyone else is of the same frame of mind. Like them we also arrogantly assume that everyone wants to be like us. It may not be true.

When reading Russian Liberalism it’s best not to think of liberals in Russia believing in all the values that we identify as those described as liberal in the West. Some do, some don’t. Robinson is good at pointing out how an economic liberal may not be a social liberal, and a cultural liberal may not be an economic liberal. Russia has its own history and traditions and it’s unwise to ignore them.

With over forty pages of notes, and a twenty-five page bibliography, this is a serious work of scholarship that can be read to advantage by both academics and general readers. 

 

 

 

            

 

 

 

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